1. What is "an informed, high-level official of the US government"; is it the President only, or does it include Cabinet Members? Is it restricted to political appointees, or does it extend into civil service roles as well?
2. "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" sounds like a definition of a legal standard, what are the elements of such a standard and would the mere possession of weaponry sufficient to carry out such an attack meet it?
3. The phrase "senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force" is used repeatedly in the document; what qualities put one in the category of an "associated force"? Would it be plausible to say that Wikileaks could be described as an associated force with al Qa'ida? Could the Syrian government be so described? What are the strictures here?
4. Given that several known killings of American citizens seem on the face of it to violate the guidelines of this document; most notably the death of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdulrahman_al-Aulaqi it would behoove the government to explain the apparent contradiction. Or if the definition of "operational leader of al-Qa'ida" has been watered down to "military aged male"; to state that publicly.
There is no question that dealing with non-state paramilitary actors undermines the nation state paradigm that the existing law of war assumes and that there are a number of edge cases where it is hard to determine whether a given individual should be treated as a combatant or as a criminal; however we as a nation and as a society cannot afford to let our leaders become mere killers without restraint; no matter how heinous the opposition.
The "military aged males" killed by drones aren't US citizens. This memo does not suggest that the US can kill any military aged male regardless of nationality.
And no, it would not be plausible to say that Wikileaks could be described as "associated with al Qaeda". You could have used the same reasoning in the 1930s and 1940s to suggest that the US could have killed Charles Coughlin; after all, he was on the radio advocating for Mussolini and Hitler!
In the particular case I referenced, he was, Abdulrahman al-Alauqi was born in Denver and was aged 16 when he was killed.
Coughlin could have faced the death penalty for sedition; but he was silenced by his bishop before that was necessary. And the logic in this document is perniciously close to that used to incarcerate thousands of US citizens of Japanese descent after Pearl Harbor.
This is why we should not vest the executive with untrammeled ability to kill on their own authority, but should restrain them to a procedure that asks them to justify the exigency to a judge at the very least.
It seems doubtful that wiki leaks would qualify, Assange is still breathing. Also, Assad is practically begging to be assassinated( not saying it should be the US that does it), I don't know why anyone would be sympathetic to someone like him. Still, he doesn't really seemed to be linked to terrorism, and he's not really a threat to anyone outside of Syria, so I doubt he'd qualify either.
The indictment against Bradley Manning states that he is being charged with knowingly giving information to the enemy. Since he gave the cables to Wikileaks, is Wikileaks "the enemy"?
Not really. Releasing secrets to the media counts as giving it to the enemy. Wikileaks was just a middleman, sort of like a hit man or a bag-man -- one can still hold the originator responsible.
I'm not taking a position on this case, only the logic you're using.
When Geraldo Rivera was in Iraq, attached to a combat unit, he went on the air and revealed his unit's future plans and location in far too specific terms. He was immediately expelled from the country on the same grounds -- giving information to the enemy -- even though he just broadcast the information, without any specific recipient in mind. Just like Manning.
No. I was asking what the standards were for being declared an allied force of al-Qa'ida and whether Wikileaks the organization would be considered one by this administration.
These are excellent questions, all of which need to be clarified sooner or later. While I'm still digesting this white paper and need to do a much more reading of the sources it quotes as well as study of the underlying issues, here's my gut feeling about what those answers will turn out to be (any or all of which might be completely wrong):-
1. I'd guess it included political appointees, such as the director of the CIA or head of the NSA.
2. This is the crucial question. The memo appears to think it requires means and motive but that the US is not obligated to wait for an opportunity before acting. Suppose, for example, that AQ had a plan to repeat 9-11 (to save my defining some new scenario). If you knew that such an operation was planned and that an individual agent of AQ had the authority to order it to commence, it would be legitimate to attack that individual even if you didn't know the precise timing and vectors of the attack. To me this is analogous to attacking an opposing general who's responsible for directing military operations against you even if he has never personally shot at you and his fighting consists of directing others' activity.
3. I'd say an 'associated force' was one that had explicitly declared itself to be affiliated with Al Qaeda or to have a common enemy (eg the US) with that organization. So while Hamas, say, is considered a terrorist organization by the US, I don't think it would be associated with AQ since its activities are confined to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict rather than being part of a global struggle. I think the word 'force' is important too, so that we're responding to the threat of actual injury rather than targeting people who just make nasty remarks about us.
4. I think this is a bit of a red herring, since there's no evidence that we were targeting that individual [the 16-yo son of Anwar Al-aulaqi/Awlaki). Unofficially, the target of that strike was one Ibrahim al-Banna (who I personally know nothing about but who I'm going to assume was a legitimate target) and Abdulrahman had the ill fortune to be in his company at the time he was attacked. While I think it's important to minimize 'collateral damage' and civilian casualties (and think drone warfare actually represents an advance in this regard), I don't feel that the incidental possibility (however improbable or unpredictable) of injuring a US citizen should serve as an effective shield for Al Qaeda's executive, such that senior AQ people effectively get issued with personal hostages to prevent them from being targeted. As Justice Jackson observed, 'the Constitution is not a suicide pact.'
I wholly agree that we can't abdicate all responsibility to the executive (ethically comforting though this might be), but nor should we abandon our legitimate interest in self-preservation to procedural paralysis. Thus, for example, the constitution contemplates not only declarations of war, but the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal without limitation in scope.
1. What is "an informed, high-level official of the US government"; is it the President only, or does it include Cabinet Members? Is it restricted to political appointees, or does it extend into civil service roles as well?
2. "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" sounds like a definition of a legal standard, what are the elements of such a standard and would the mere possession of weaponry sufficient to carry out such an attack meet it?
3. The phrase "senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force" is used repeatedly in the document; what qualities put one in the category of an "associated force"? Would it be plausible to say that Wikileaks could be described as an associated force with al Qa'ida? Could the Syrian government be so described? What are the strictures here?
4. Given that several known killings of American citizens seem on the face of it to violate the guidelines of this document; most notably the death of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdulrahman_al-Aulaqi it would behoove the government to explain the apparent contradiction. Or if the definition of "operational leader of al-Qa'ida" has been watered down to "military aged male"; to state that publicly.
There is no question that dealing with non-state paramilitary actors undermines the nation state paradigm that the existing law of war assumes and that there are a number of edge cases where it is hard to determine whether a given individual should be treated as a combatant or as a criminal; however we as a nation and as a society cannot afford to let our leaders become mere killers without restraint; no matter how heinous the opposition.